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I have heard that voice many a time when asleep
and, what is strange, I understood more or less
an order or an appeal in an unearthly tongue:
day draws near
another one
do what you can. 1
I. INTRODUCTION

Wars are acts of State, and therefore there has never been a "war
on terror." Of course states have fought terrorism, in many guises,
for centuries. But a war on terror had to await the development of
states-including virtual states like al Qaeda's global
ummah 2-whose constitutional order was not confined to a
particular territory or national group and for whom terror could
therefore be a permanent state of international affairs, either
sought in order to prevent persons within a state's control from
resisting oppression by accessing global, empowering resources and
networks, or suffered because other states wished to press such a
condition on us and because our global vulnerabilities could not be
detached from our prosperity and freedom.
Professor's Levinson's warning must therefore prepare us not
only for the aftermaths of an attack by al Qaeda, but also for attacks
mounted by twenty-first century terrorism of which al Qaeda is only
a herald. 3 Just as terrorists in earlier centuries mimicked the states
they were struggling against, so terrorists in the twenty-first
century will copy the decentralized, devolved, outsourcing and
privatized market-state of the twenty-first century, instead of
modeling their activities after those ofthe national liberation groups
of the twentieth century that fought nation-states.

1

CZESLAW MILOSZ, On Angels, in THE COLLECTED POEMS: 1931-1987,

at 248, 248-49

(1988).
2

See S.A. NIGOSIA, ISLAM: ITS HISTORY, TEACHING, AND PRACTICES, at xvi (2004)
(describing ummah as worldwide community oflslam).
3
See generally Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent
Emergency, 40 GA. L. REv. 699 (2006).
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Although many people recognize the revolution in military affairs
that is underway, and some recognize the revolution in
constitutional affairs that is partly the result, very few recognize
that the revolution in constitutional affairs is, in turn, driving the
revolution in military affairs. The overwhelming military power of
the United States is a direct consequence of its emergence as an
entrepreneurial market state. The constitutional basis for the
legitimacy of the states of the new, emerging, twenty-first century
constitutional order-market-states 4 -- differs profoundly from that
of their predecessors, the twentieth century nation-states.5
The strategic raison d'9tre of the market-state is the protection
of civilians, not territory or national wealth or any particular
dynasty, class, religion, or ideology. Had nation-states been able to
protect civilians successfully, they might have survived with their
basis for legitimacy-the promise of ever-improving material wellbeing-intact.6 During the wars of nation-states in the twentieth
century, however, the ratio of civilian to military casualties went
from twenty percent civilian in the First World War to eighty
percent civilian in the Second World War and the wars that followed
in its wake.7 By changing the basis for legitimacy, market-states
undertook to change the bargain offered for power. They promised
to maximize opportunity, not guarantee security, and this new
compact imposed an enormous security burden on market-states:
their civilians had to be free of that coercive fear that vitiated any
real increase in opportunity. Market-states that claim power on the
basis that they maximize the opportunities of the individual citizen
(including protecting civilian lives) undermine that claim when they
must coexist with conditions of perpetual terror and pervasive fear.'

4 See generally PHILIP BOBBrrr, THE SHIELD OFACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE

OF HIsTORY 213-42 (2002) (describing rise of market-states).
' See Oscar Schachter, The Decline of the Nation-State and Its Implications for
InternationalLaw, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 7, 7-8 (discussing factors contributing to
decline of nation-state).
6 BOBBrrr, supra note 4, at 216.
7 Phillippa Kirsch, The InternationalCriminal Court: Consensus and Debate on the
International Adjudication of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and
Aggression, 32 CORNELL INVL L.J. 437, 441-42 (1999).
8 See BOBBIT, supra note 4, at xxvi (discussing conflict within market-states).
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For market-states, the stakes are achingly high. For example, an
avian flu epidemic-whether engineered by a state and given to
terrorists, created by terrorists themselves (the genetic code of the
1918 flu that killed fifty million persons may be available on the
Internet 9), or naturally occurring---could strike globally with an
unprecedented velocity. Similarly, a nuclear device detonated in a
major twenty-first century city would dwarf the casualties at
Hiroshima. This new vulnerability has important implications not
just for diplomacy, but also for preemption and anticipatory strikes
because it is a verity in international affairs that reason alone will
seldom get states to listen to reason.
This development will force other states and nonstate
competitors to adopt asymmetric tactics, and both these
developments-U.S. military dominance and its reciprocal,
asymmetric, outsourced tactics-will accelerate the emergence of
market-states. At the same time the market-state, with its allvolunteer military forces, decentralized command, networked
communities, and so forth, will determine the conditions of warfare.
The ever-increasing trend toward individual empowerment, to
which the market-state is a contributor, will inevitably, if
paradoxically, imperil democratic systems that depend upon the
individual conscience by empowering those who would destroy
individual rights and powers.
It is the United States, our global presence, our overwhelming
armed power, and our example as one of the first emerging marketstates, that is the principal driver behind this new form of
terrorism. 10 Those who oppose the United States, for whatever
reason, confront an adversary they cannot attack by traditional
military means, but whose organization for war-the marketstate-they must copy in order to challenge us. Market-state
terrorism will not be limited to Muslims or persons from the Middle
East; indeed, in its most troubling form, we may never know the
true identity of those who attack us. But these attacks will come
because the United States is too powerful to challenge in any

' Jamie Shreeve, Why Revive a Deadly Flu Virus?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 29, 2006, at

48.

I' See BOBBrrr, supra note 4, at 819-21 (discussing 9/11 attacks).
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conventional way, too vulnerable to be free from assault, and too
ever-present either to avoid hostility or be secluded from harm.
After the September 11th attacks, it became fashionable to ask
whether those atrocities were perpetrated by persons who hated the
United States for what it does (aid to Israel, for example), or
because of who we are (freedom-loving and materialist, perhaps)."
Each of these answers is a half-truth, because by the things we do,
so are we known. We are, to a large extent, what we do. The
agenda of human rights protection is the central political idea of the
West today, and it is an idea that, on the one hand, so reflects our
identity and our aspirations that to compromise that idea is
unthinkable. But on the other hand, it is a profoundly disturbing
idea to those who believe we will not permit them-or perhaps
owing to the global penetration of cultures, cannot coexist with
others who want-to live as they wish.
To say that U.S. presence is the principal driver of market-state
terrorism is not to blame the United States anymore than
fourteenth century urbanization was to "blame" for the plague. The
resentment this presence fosters cannot simply be laid to American
interventions. U.S.-led intervention has been undertaken on behalf
of Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and Somalia. Moreover, in
many places, the United States was the target of anger when it did
12
not intervene.
If the source of Islamic terrorism lay in Western intervention in
the conflicts of the Middle East, one strategic response would
recommend itself strongly: 3 Abandon Afghanistan and Iraq, vacate
U.S. bases in the region, and disavow the state of Israel. 4 Whatever
the other consequences of such a response, of one I am
certain-Islamic terrorism would continue; indeed, it would become

" See, e.g., Greg Winter, In a Shift, Muslim Groups Cart Themselves as Loyal Critics,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 25,2001, at A16 (stating that some groups blame American involvement in
Middle East for 9/11).
12 See BOBBT, supra note 4, at 779 (discussing consequences of abandoning
intervention).
13 Though not decisively, because there are other items on the Western counterterrorism
agenda.
14 Olivier Roy, Op-Ed, Why Do They Hate Us? Not Because of Iraq,N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2005, at A19.
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far more confident and virulent. That is because the cause of this
plague does not lie in the Middle East at all.
Of course, al Qaeda relentlessly raises the issue of the oppression
of Muslims through the warfare in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan
as a way of gaining adherents and legitimacy, but these theaters
cannot be said to be the motivating cause of a global jihad."6 As has
been often pointed out, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq came
after 9/11 and well before bin Laden (or Mohammed Atta) showed
any interest in Palestine, whose national liberation struggle he and
other al Qaeda figures disparaged.16 And although bin Laden
complained of the proximity of U.S. bases to the holy Muslim
shrines in Saudi Arabia following the first Gulf War, this came some
time after his conversion to global jihad; in any case, the bases have
been closed, and the jihad continues. 7
Additionally, as Olivier Roy has observed, if Afghanistan, Iraq,
and Palestine were the proximate cause of al Qaeda, why do we find
almost no Afghans, Iraqis, or Palestinians among those jihadists
who attack the West?' 8
Why would a [British citizen ofi Pakistani [descent] or a
Spaniard [of Moroccan ancestry] be more angry than an
Afghan about American troops in Afghanistan? It is
precisely because they do not care about Afghanistan as
such, but see the United States involvement there as
part of a global phenomenon of cultural domination.
[Tiheir vision of a global ummah is both a mirror of
and a form of revenge against the globalization that has
made them what they are.' 9
Realizing this, however, gives us-those persons who wish to
preserve states of consent-a precise locus for the solution even

1 Id.

6 See Mark Danner, Taking Stock of the Forever War, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 11, 2005,

at 45 (giving history of al Qaeda).
17

Id.

'8 Roy, supra note 14.
19 Id.
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though the problem is amorphous and universal. We must heal
ourselves and strengthen our alliances if we are to bear the burden
of warring against terror. There is really no alternative to this
struggle. Even though American power is the main element driving
a new form of terrorism, reducing or hobbling that power will not
make the terrorists go away, even while it cripples the one state
capable of leading coalitions to defend us. Instead, that power must
be employed preclusively, rather than waiting for an acute crisis
that irrevocably puts us at a disadvantage. Preemption of terrorist
attacks, active counterproliferation, and preventative intervention
to forestall human rights abuses like genocide or other gross
violations of human rights all have roles to play.
Finally, greater opportunities for marginal groups in the societies
of the democracies can inoculate those persons who might otherwise
be drawn into terrorist activities. For example, in the United
Kingdom, there are groups whose young members convert to radical
Islam-including not only second generation South Asians, but also
those from the Caribbean islands. In the United States, there are
groups drawn from similarly alienated minorities who, hardened by
incarceration in penitentiaries, have embraced racialist ideologies.
Co-opting these persons is one element of a preclusive strategy.
II. THE WAR AGAINST TERROR AS AN "EPocHAL WAR"
Can a state make terror an element of its claim to legitimacy, or
must it win legitimacy by seeking the consent of the people it would
control? This constitutional question is the common feature that
ties together terrorism, the acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction for compellance (rather than deterrence), and the
terrorizing of domestic populations through genocide and ethnic
cleansing.
In the twentieth century, the constitutional issue that united the
First and Second World Wars, the Bolshevik Revolution, the
Spanish Civil War, the wars in Korea and Vietnam, and the Cold
War was: What sort of nation-state-a constitutional order that
arose in the late nineteenth century, superseding the imperial order
of state-nations that had dominated that century-would succeed to
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the legitimacy of that earlier order? Would it be a communist,
fascist, or parliamentary nation-state?
The twentieth century had barely ended, and its Long War
resolved in favor of the parliamentary state, when a new war, the
war on al Qaeda, began. This war-like the First World War that
began the Long War, or the Bohemian Revolt in 1618 that sparked
the Thirty Years War-began for local reasons. In this case, the war
arose from the ambitions of Muslim fundamentalists and the
transnational civil war they sought within Islam. But the war on al
Qaeda is only a part, though the first part, of the larger war against
terror that will continue until the fundamental question about the
legitimacy of a new constitutional order is resolved.
The
constitutional question this larger war poses is: Will the legitimate
form of the market-state be a state of consent or a state of terror?
That is why I believe that historians may one day see the war
against terror as an epochal war, a historical and constitutional
characterization that can only be made retrospectively. 0
In the twenty-first century, the war against terror can play an
analogous role in history to that of the twentieth century's war on
totalitarianism. In both cases, separate wars that began for local
reasons eventually implicated the fundamental constitutional order
of states, uniting these separate conflicts in a single epochal war.2 '
Each became, as all epochal wars become, a war over the
constitutional basis of the legitimate state. Yet this new war is also
fundamentally different from its predecessor.

III. THE WAR AGAINST TERROR AS A "PRECLUSIVE WAR"
Aggressor states seldom seek war. They seek victories and, if
necessary, may be willing to risk war to gain those victories. Wars
begin when a state resists aggression. A state that faces a
deteriorating strategic position will join battle-for it takes two to
make war-in order to prevent a further weakening of its situation.
In this sense, all wars are wars of prevention.

'o See generally BOBBrr, supra note 4 (discussing epochal wars in context of shifting
world orders).
21 Id. at 24-69 (discussing 1914-1990 as epochal war).
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The war against terror did not begin when Osama bin Laden
declared war against the United States on August 23, 1996, nor
when al Qaeda terrorist forces attacked two American embassies in
Africa on August 7, 1998 and a U.S. naval vessel on October 12,
2000, nor even when the Pentagon and the World Trade Center were
struck by hijacked commercial airliners on September 11, 2001.22
Rather, it commenced when the United States determined to
prevent further attacks by means of warfare. Bin Laden's 1996
"Declaration of Jihad against the Americans" was an act of
diplomacy, an ultimatum, for which there are many precedents.
The ensuing atrocities were infamous crimes. It was only when the
U.S. decided to treat the attacks as acts of war, however, that the
war against terror began.
The war against al Qaeda is the first in what will be a series of
conflicts by which the United States and its allies attempt to
preclude other states and nonstate entities from organized violence
against their own people, their neighbors, and ourselves. In that
sense, it is a war of prevention. Like epochal wars, preventative
wars have occurred in the past.
The war against terror, however, is a unique form of preventative
war because it is preclusive in nature; that is, it seeks prevent a
state of affairs-humanitarian crises owing to genocide, compellance
by means of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), or terror that
disables democracies-from coming into being well in advance of
imminent aggression. This approach is necessary because after any
of these states of affairs arises it is likely to be impossible to return
to the status quo ante. Once Kim Jong I1 actually acquires nuclear
weapons, or once a million refugees have been driven from their
homes in Darfur, or once a terrorist mass atrocity actually
devastates an American city, it will be too late to undo the matter,
and only tragedy and terror will follow. If unchecked, the ensuing
loss will eventually include the conditions of consent that govern
civilized democracies.
Bin Laden and his as yet inchoate successors understand that
states that govern by consent cannot do so in conditions of terror.

' See Excerpts from the Report of the Sept. 11 Commission: A Unity of Purpose, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A14 (describing terrorist attacks on United States).
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They also understand that their own prescriptive role for the state
demands that it create a condition of terror for its citizens.
Imposing states of terror is their objective, for themselves and,
paradoxically, for their enemies.
IV. THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF TERROR
Plague treatises were books written in the fourteenth, fifteenth,
and sixteenth centuries by physicians trying to explain to their
contemporaries what had caused the plague and how to cope with
it. 2

Some blamed the sinfulness of the victims. Others blamed

infidels like Muslims and Jews, or heretics like certain Christian
radical sects we might nowadays call "fundamentalists." One
author, John of Paris, wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth
century that we might never know what truly caused the plague.
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, global,
networked, market-state terrorism is not much better understood
than the plague was then.
The problem of terrorism is similar in some ways to that of an
epidemic. Like new antibiotic-resistant strains of tuberculosis,
market-state terrorism is a function of what we have done
successfully to eradicate old threats. That is, its principal causes
are the liberalization of the global economy, the internationalization
of the electronic media, and the military and technological
revolution-all ardently sought innovations-that won the Long
War.'
New, mutated strains of tuberculosis are resistant to
antibiotics for similar reasons; that is, they are the direct result of
the successful treatment of earlier forms of the virus that has
mutated in order to resist treatment.
We have had states of terror before, though perhaps we didn't call
them that. Now the connectivity of all parts of the world means
that states have a harder time managing their affairs on the basis
of consent when states of terror are allowed to flourish. Terrorism,
relying on this connectivity, can even induce a humanitarian crisis

2 See generally George R. Keiser, Two Medieval PlagueTreatisesand Their Afterlife in
Early Modern England, 58 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED Sci. 292 (2003).
24 BOBBrrr, supra note 4, at 826.
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through panic and disruption.25
involving a so-called "dirty bomb":

Consider this final scenario

[Flour simultaneous attacks are made on the US,
involving three truck bombs and a bomb in a shipping
container, in Newark, Detroit, Long Beach and Miami.
Fatalities are restricted to a few motorists .

.

. but

because the bombs contain americium-241 and cesium137 they spread panic out of all proportion to their
actual damage ....

People flee the infected cities.

America closes its borders, paralyzing world trade.
Supermarket shelves are emptying. There's talk of
airlifting food to Hawaii. The social, economic, and
political costs of the attacks (which in themselves cause
no more harm than the average industrial accident) are
beyond calculation.2"
The United States is, in a sense, the connectivity that makes such
a scenario altogether plausible.
We may not appreciate the true etiology of market-state
terrorism simply because we do not have the conceptual tools that
enable us to analyze a new and complex phenomenon (as the
authors of the plague treatises did not have the germ theory of
infection). We must confront the possibility that we will not
extinguish global terrorism because we and the rest of the
international community will be unable to transform our ideas
rapidly enough. Much important work remains to be done on the
conceptual side of this war. We do not, as of yet, have the
intellectual movement-of which Bernard Brodie and Thomas
Schelling were leaders,27 and the RAND Corporation a
'

See Jonathan Raban, The Truth About Terrorism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 13, 2005, at

22 (reviewing STEPHEN FLYNN, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: HOW OUR GOVERNMENT IS
FAILING TO PROTECT US FROM TERRORISM (2004) and describing potential crisis resulting from

hypothetical terrorist attack scenario).
2

Id.

'

See generally,e.g., BERNARD BRODIE, STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE (1959) (discussing

origins of strategic air combat and suggesting deterrent solutions to problems created by
advent of nuclear weapons); THoMAsC. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1963) (using

game theory to describe strategic problems of armed conflict, including special problems
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center 98-that achieved a consensus on nuclear strategies during the
Cold War. The use of global scenarios is an underdeveloped, and at
present underused, means of anticipating future crises and coping
with or even preventing them.
What we do know is that terror is the enemy of conscience, and
therefore, it is the enemy of consent. One who cannot say "no"
cannot truly say "yes." That places terrorism along with crimes
against humanity and compellance by WMD at the center of our
survival as states of consent. Others know this, too. On December
28, 2004, on the eve of the Iraqi elections, Osama bin Laden released
an audio tape: "Everyone who participates in these elections will be
considered infidels" and, as such, subject to attack, he said.2" The
true image of al Qaeda, and the Sunni cells with which it has linked
up in Iraq, is not simply that of a stately bin Laden draped in the
robes of an emir, announcing diplomatic initiatives on Al Jazeera.
It is also a grainy, black and white telephoto of a gunman standing
over an kneeling, unarmed election official whom he is about to
murder in a street while passersby do nothing.
That is an image from a state of terror. We must also be clear,
however, about what constitutes a state of consent. A state of
consent need not be a Western-style democracy; indeed, as I have
suggested, one terrible possibility is that the war against terrorism
will be lost and that our democracies will become states of terror.3 °
Rather, a state of consent is one in which all persons can exercise
the rights of conscience and in the politics of which the individual
conscience plays the decisive role. By assimilating this struggle into
the Long War against twentieth century fascism and communism,
we mistake what is unique to the war against terror-the import
into our societies of psychological states that render free consent
impossible, and the export into other societies of global effects that
jeopardize traditional local coercion.

presented by nuclear warfare).
28 See PROJECTAIRFORCE: 1946-1996, at 23-28 (1996), availableat http'/www.rand.org/
publications/PAFbook.pdf(detailing RAND participation and influence in developing nuclear
strategy).
' Tape Opposing Vote Attributed to Bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2004, at A9.
30 BOBBIrr, supra note 4, at 729-35.
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We will not win the "war on terror" if we do not understand the
novelty of the problem we face. We must not neglect the symbiosis
between strategy and law that is reflected in the revolution in
military and constitutional affairs that is underway, and the
transformation of the state that is both a cause and consequence of
that revolution. Owing to this two-way relationship, terrorism is
one of the principal forces destroying the legitimacy of the nationstate and leading to the market-state, and the market-state is a
principal force in transforming twentieth century, nationalistic
terrorism into twenty-first century, global, networked terrorism.
Neglecting this relationship will delegitimate our legal standing in
international and constitutional law and forfeit the fruits of our
strategic advantages by using tactics that alienate domestic
populations in the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere.
The reason the United States is not itself a terrorist state even
though its warfare brings suffering and destruction to many
innocent persons, including civilians, is that it acts within the law.
When it ceases to do so-when, for example, the law has not kept up
with changes in the strategic context or when, without that excuse,
U.S. strategy studiously ignores the applicable law-the United
States runs the risk of becoming, in the eyes of many, simply
another state of terror.
V. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TERRORISM AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

In every era of the state, throughout the evolution of its
constitutional orders, societies have confronted the problem of
determining the proper relationship between strategy and law.
Outside its territorial domain, the state seeks to be free of external
coercion; this is strategy. Inside its boundaries, the state seeks to
monopolize legitimate violence; this is law. But what measures are
appropriate, within its territory, to prosecute the war outside when
inside and outside have lost their clear boundaries-when terrorist
warfare occurs within national peoples, like the civil wars of the
past, and when events far from our societies have a delegitimating
effect on our states?
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Governments must explore the changing relationships between
the intelligence agencies (as they become more dependent on open
sources) and the media (as they become more powerful purveyors
and validators of secrets); between the political parties who must
take up this highly charged debate in order to write laws that might
be necessary in a time of emergency; between federal unions and
their constituent parts (both in the United States and the European
Union) where intelligence, in the case of the United States is not
shared by the central union, and, in the case of the European Union,
not shared with the central union owing to national distrust.
Governments will have to learn how to find and work with private
sector collaborators, partly because they own most of the critical
infrastructure that we must make less vulnerable, and partly
because they are market-oriented and global, thus arcing some of
the gaps between the nation-state and the market-state.
Governments must rethink ideas like "Homeland Security" when
the threats to security cannot be neatly cabined as in or out of the
homeland, just as the American and British governments must
revisit the issues of cooperation between the CIA and the FBI and
between MI5 and MI6-issues that arise owing to jurisdictional
divisions between domestic and international operations-because
these agencies are so completely defined by the Long War and its
basis in the nation-state."'
States must measure their tactical and strategic policies against
the effect these policies are likely to have on their legitimacy. If the
United States were to abandon its executive order prohibiting
assassinations, what is the cost to its legitimacy as a state that
follows the rule of law, one principle of which is that no criminal
penalty can be levied without a fair and open trial? On the other
hand, if the United States is at war, is the executive order even
relevant? By such means, the domestic environment of states is
steadily militarized. Similarly, does it matter what we are fighting
for, or is "one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter"? We
do not apply murder statutes to soldiers in battle, even enemy
soldiers. Soldiers are permitted to maim and kill civilians if that is
not their aim, while we condemn the terrorist whose objective is to
31 See BOBBrrT, supra note 4, at 235-38 (discussing security in market-state).
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kill civilians. By such means, the foreign environment can be
degraded into a sea of "collateral damage." Put the two together,
and the "war on terror" can make our soldiers into organized
vigilantes, using the methods of warfare against civilians, domestic
and foreign.
If our governments engage in torture, perhaps by turning over
prisoners to less squeamish national intelligence services, are they
substantiating the charges made against them by those who say
ours are the true rogue states, and that the state terror of the
United States and its allies, including Israel, is every much a threat
to mankind as the terrorism of al Qaeda? These are essentially
constitutional issues. They are not so much matters of civil
liberties, of course, as they are profound issues of the self-definition
societies achieve through their constitutional processes in time of
war. They are matters of constitutional legitimacy because they are
matters of self-respect. States must have clear answers to these
questions, because if the legitimacy of the state is compromised, it
will seed its own terrorists who will take up arms against it in
revulsion. For my own part, I believe there must be a bright-line
rule against torture anywhere, even if, in the most extreme
circumstance, this rule is broken by decent men willing to pay the
legal penalties for their acts.
If the United States and the United Kingdom ally themselves
with undemocratic autocracies who share our fear of al Qaeda but
with whom we have little else in common, are we simply borrowing
against a future in which those peoples we have helped to suppress
rise up and blame us? We are often blamed for collaborating with
dictators in the Third World to fight communism, though we are
seldom blamed for the no less awful collaboration with communism
to defeat fascism. Is there a realistic choice? If it is true that full
and fair elections in a dozen Islamic states would bring bin Laden
to power in every one of them, does the international community
dare to risk such elections? And if it does not, does this make us
hypocrites to claim that the sovereignty of other states, like Iraq, is
forfeited owing to their undemocratic practices, while turning a
blind eye toward the legitimacy of regimes that are allied to ours but
which deny their citizens basic human rights? I believe that our
commitment to globalize the systems of democracy itself-or what
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we mistake for the pluralistic system we have evolved and called
"democracy"-must be restated in terms that reflect the strategic
interests of the states of consent to enlarge their number.
Answering urgent strategic questions about terrorism will also
require us to give some thought to larger constitutional questions
about sovereignty, democracy, and the laws of war. If we ignore
these issues, we will find we have decided them, inadvertently, in
unthinking acts of crisis. My own view, as I have argued in the
preceding pages, is that the key concept we must define is not
democracy per se, but rather the inalienable rights of which selfgovernment is but one element. Respect for these rights assures a
state of inviolable sovereignty, and that sovereignty is a fortiori a
limited one. When this limited sovereignty is forfeited by acts of the
state-against its own citizens, its neighbors, or the world order
that underpins the recognition of sovereignty itself-then that state
can be subject to sanction. Limited sovereignty, not simply majority
voting, creates a state of consent. Therefore, one of our most urgent
tasks is to develop legal standards in constitutional and
international law that help us determine what is comprised by the
idea of inalienable human rights.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES
It is clear that the terrorists of al Qaeda believe they can win this
war because they perceive that other states, including American
allies, lack a sincere interest in collaborating with the United
States. All technologically advanced states will ultimately be
threatened by twenty-first century terrorism. It is understandable,
but regrettable, that some of these states would strive to protect
their citizens by disassociating themselves from the United States
and thus from the most prominent political target in the West.
While the United States must play a leading role in winning the
war against terror, that war can only be won with the collaboration
of many states, including some states that fear and even loathe
American primacy. The risks of leadership are two-fold: If the
United States is out in front, it becomes the target for every
terrorist group that wants a free hand for its local predations. At
the same time, America becomes the focal point of charges by other
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states that it is seeking an empire. Some of those who make the
latter charge believe that overwhelming power necessarily leads to
empire, indeed, that such power is the very definition of empire.
The United States is very powerful, economically and militarily.
It has the world's largest economy, greater than those of all the
other members of the G8 combined, and it is growing at a faster rate
than they are.32 The United States is the only state that can settle
its debts in its own currency.3" It is the only remaining military
superpower, owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and
American defense budgets approach half a trillion dollars.34 Yet we
should not be misled by these figures. Like the much-cited increase
in the gap between high and low income earners, these statistics
conceal an equally important truth-that the development gap
between high and low is closing. This means that while the United
States has a large army equipped with infinitely superior weaponry
and communications, the harm that can be done to the American
nation is growing more quickly-as technology disperses and
becomes cheaper-than its lead is growing. In other words, poor
states-or rich terrorist groups-who could not begin to mount a
challenge by invading across a contested plain, can hope to do
enough damage to dissuade the United States or any other powerful
state from attempting to coerce them. This paradox-America's
increasingly greater power and greater vulnerability-means that
America is the indispensable leader of the war on terrorism (because
it alone has the resources) and that it has a vital interest in being
such a leader (because it is also very vulnerable).
Yet American leadership actually tempts disarray and
noncooperation. The former French Foreign Minister, Hubert
Vedrine, spoke for many when he said, "We cannot accept a
politically unipolar world."35 It is regrettably true that when, in the
32 See CIA, The World Factbook, Rank Order-GDP (2005), http://www.cia.gov/cia/

publications/factbook/rankorder/200lrank.html (listing GDPs of nations that include current
G8 members)
" See David H. Levey & Stuart S. Brown, The Overstretch Myth, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.Apr. 2005, at 2, 3 (noting that the "United States' external liabilities are denominated in its
own currency").
' See Jonathan Karp, MilitaryBudget Spares Weapons from Cutbacks, WALL ST. J., Feb.
6, 2006, at A6 (reporting President Bush's proposed 2007 defense budget of $439.3 billion).
' Christopher Layne, What's Built Up Must Come Down, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1999, at
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midst of ongoing hostilities in Iraq, the French Foreign Minister
Dominique de Villepin was asked at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies which side he wanted to see win that war, he
simply declined to answer.3 6 Indeed there are many who see the
war on terrorism as a kind of stalking horse for the creation of an
American empire.3 7 And, whatever their views about the "war on
terror," there are many who simply wish to see American forces
defeated in whatever action they undertake.
One must shudder at the consequences for the world of such
attitudes, to say nothing of the effect on the war against terror.
They invite an anti-American multipolarity with which the worst
and most retrograde forces can tacitly combine. Multipolarity is not
simply a condition of mutually affecting forces but of mutually
opposed forces. How many persons who have called for a European
army in order to "balance" the Americans have actually thought
through what such an army would do to achieve the objective of
thwarting American unilateralism? If that army were to join
American expeditions then it might well have influence on allied
policy. But this is not what the opponents of U.S. leadership have
in mind. Indeed they have frantically (and successfully) tried to
keep NATO forces out of Iraq. If, however, the objective is to
prevent U.S. forces from intervening in Serbia or Afghanistan or
Iraq or the Sudan, then such an army must be used to threaten the
use of force. What other role could it possibly play in achieving such
an objective? That was how multipolarity checked U.S. polices
before 1989 when the Soviet army stood ready to oppose any allied
attempts to liberate Eastern Europe. Is it possible that any sane
person would want to recreate the conditions for such an armed
confrontation in the twenty-first century?
There is one scenario for which the world is not prepared. A
series of strikes against the American and British homelands using
nuclear or biological weapons would remove from the world's affairs

BOL.
Alan Cowell, A Nation at War: Overture from Paris;FranceHolds Out a Tentative
Olive Branch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2003, at B10.
' See, e.g., Michael Meaches, Comment & Analysis, This War on Terrorismis Bogus,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 6, 2003, at 21 (arguing that United States has used 9/11 as pretext for
attempting global dominance).
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the two states willing and, with others, able to organize the defense
of the society of states of consent. Like the collapse of the Soviet
Union, this is the one contingency for which no one has planned. I
implore the reader to contemplate how terrible a fate this would be
for human rights, for the economic development of all states, and for
the security of those societies that wish to live in tranquility. We
may think that it is the United States that disturbs that tranquility
today because we measure our anxiety against the most peaceful
recent past. We should instead measure our states against the
alternative future of a world without the energetic but benign
intentions of the Americans.
VII. THE NEED FOR NEW STANDARDS
We must urgently develop legal and strategic parameters for
state action in the war on terrorism. This will be a matter,
ultimately, of drawing the links between successfully warring on
terror and the evolving legal concepts of sovereignty and its
relationship to lawful, legitimate governance. As Sir Michael
Howard has wisely and trenchantly put it,
An explicit American hegemony may appear preferable
to the messy compromises of the existing order, but if it
is nakedly based on commercial interests and military
power it will lack all legitimacy. Terror will continue
and, worse, widespread sympathy with terror. But
American power placed at the service of an international
community legitimised by representative institutions
and the rule of law, accepting its constraints and
inadequacies but continually working to improve them:
that is a very different matter. It is by doing this that
the US has earned admiration, respect, and indeed
affection throughout the world over the past half
century. But if that relationship is to continue, and
respect is to overcome hate, the US must cease to think
of itself as a heroic lone protagonist in a cosmic war
against 'evil', and reconcile itself to a less spectacular
and more humdrum role: that of the leading participant
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in a flawed but still indispensable system of co-operative
global governance."
There is, at present, no more important question before the world
because failure to resolve the question of legitimate cooperation will
frustrate not only our efforts against global terrorism, but also those
aimed at avoiding regional climate change, regional and global
epidemics, and great power confrontation.
We might start with the definition of what constitutes terrorism:
Terrorism is the use of violence in order to advance a political cause
by preventing persons from doing what they would otherwise
lawfully do. Beginning with such a definition, we can then work out
what a state is permitted to do in its search for terrorists and in its
efforts to suppress them. With such a definition, we could seek an
international convention universally outlawing terrorism as we
outlaw piracy. With such a definition, we could determine when a
group consists of terrorists or "freedom fighters," and when other
states may intervene to stop them. I have argued that only states
of consent are, prima facie, the victims of terrorism."
We might then be able to address the new U.S. National Security
Strategy and its call for preemption4 ° in light of its obvious conflict
with Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the
41
use of force outside the Charter's carefully circumscribed limits.
These limits provide that it is unlawful for a state to use force in the
absence of an actual or imminent attack except by Security Council
authorization. 42 This suggests that it is also unlawful-in the
absence of a Security Council resolution-for one state to preempt
another's warmaking capabilities before these are ever readied for
use. Yet in the era of disguised attacks through terrorist networks,
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can make
preemption an absolute necessity. For once any state, no matter
'
39

Michael Howard, Smoke on the Horizon, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2002, at 1.
See PHILIP BOBBIT'r, THE WAR ON TERROR (forthcoming 2007).

4o The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 13-14 (2002), available
at http'/www.whithouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
41 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, availableat http'//www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapterl.
htm.
42 See generally U.N. Charter art. 39-51, availableathttp'/www.un.org/aboutun/charter/
chapter7.htm (concerning threats to peace and acts of aggression).
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how repugnant, acquires nuclear weapons (a moment that no U.N.
or U.S. monitoring seems capable of predicting with precision), it is
too late to compel deproliferation. Once summoned, the genie must
do the bidding of its new master.
Nor should a search for such parameters exclude the
consideration of charges of American state terrorism.
If
assassinations and torture by allied states are countenanced, indeed
financed, by the United States-either because we support their war
aims or because they are our proxies-then, it is argued, the United
States is rightly subject to the same accusations of terrorism it
would hurl at any other state that employed such methods. The
United States may be able to persuade its citizens and its allies that
these tactics are the only effective means of protecting a society at
war with those who can easily infiltrate it and whose operations
prefigure the tactics we will ourselves be forced to adopt. Given the
theatrical nature of twenty-first century terrorism, we cannot
exclude the possibility that it will inevitably escalate in violence, as
states of terror vie with their own past atrocities to capture the
horrified attention of a busy and easily distracted people. But if
such events compel the United States to adopt what are at present
unlawful methods, we must have standards to determine whether
they are more like the air campaigns of World War II that relied on
strategic bombing to achieve their military goals (with such awful
consequences for civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki), or more like
the bombing of civilian populations that sought instead an in
terrorem effect, which we now condemn as war crimes (like the blitz
against London, or perhaps the Allied bombing of Dresden).
We must develop new rules of international law that incorporate
these parameters. These rules would be used to determine when it
is permissible for one state to intervene in another's affairs in order
to protect itself or its allies from terrorism (jus ad bellum).
Similarly, they would govern the ways states may lawfully treat
prisoners during war (jus in bello). Obviously, the Geneva
Conventions4" apply to all prisoners taken in the war against terror.
This is one consequence of designating this conflict as a war. But

' Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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just as obviously, we need to amend the Geneva Conventions to deal
with the question posed at Guantanamo: What treatment is to be
accorded prisoners of the war against terror? They are not
combatants in uniform, with a publicly acknowledged chain of
command, to whom the status of prisoner of war is accorded. But
they are not spies or partisans either. As soldiers, even if unlawful
ones, who are captured on the field of battle, they can be held in
prisons until the end of the conflict without trial or arraignment."
This scarcely makes sense, however, when there is no nation-state
with which to agree to end the conflict or to make arrangements for
prisoner exchanges-that is, when these prisoners may be held
perpetually because the field of battle is everywhere and the conflict
is perpetual.4 5
Michael Reisman has observed that international lawyers feel
they must rally around existing international rules in order to
protect the overall influence of international law.' This is precisely
what is vitiating that influence. A similar remark might be made
of some civil libertarians. Consider for example, the report of the
commission on the use of data mining. The majority took the view
that more restrictive policies regarding the sharing of information
than those required by U.S. Supreme Court precedent, should now
be put in place47 even though every report has concluded that our
current policies regarding information-sharing were too restrictive
to head off the attacks of 9/11.

4

See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (noting that "law of war" distinguishes

between lawful and unlawful combatants, and that both are "subject to capture and
detention").
' Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519-21 (2004) (noting that "war on terror" is
unconventional, and leaving open possibility for shift in law-of-war jurisprudence should
circumstances of future conflict necessitate such change).
" See W. Michael Reisman, Manley 0. Hudson Medal Lecture: Why Regime Change Is
(Almost Always) a Bad Idea, 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 290, 293 (2004) ("International
lawyers who prioritize state sovereignty have consistently condemned all regime changes.").
47 TECH. & PRIVACYADVISORY COMM., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SAFEGUARDING PRIVACY IN THE
FIGHTAGAINSTTERRORISM 43 (2004), httpJ/www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/20040300tapac.

pdf.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
We are not winning the war against terror because we do not
understand its deep connections to historic changes in the nature of
the state. As part of the transition from nation-state to marketstate, terrorism will become the continuation of diplomacy by other
means, waged by state proxies and by entities that are not
controlled by conventional states that seek to influence the politics
of states by theatrical killings and atrocities. Strategy and law,
which were carefully separated in the twentieth century of nationstates, will have to be reintegrated in the twenty-first century of
market-states. Neglecting this task is the reason we are not
winning this war, but we have not yet lost the war either. The first
step towards winning is to put the war against terror in a larger
historical, strategic, and legal context.
We must shatter the complacency that reassures itself that
nothing has really changed, that is persuaded that any imposition
is too irksome to be justified, and that protests that any concern is
trumped-up in order to exploit fear for political purposes. This must
be done without at the same time using the new threats as a Trojan
horse for the social remedies one always favored, or as a way of
discrediting the arguments of adversaries by impugning their
motives.
Let me be quite clear about my views, because in the current
political climate they are apt to be assimilated into the positions
taken by others. I do not believe that we must sacrifice our
traditional freedoms to win the war against terror. Indeed, my
point is to draw attention to the fact that twenty-first century
terrorism poses a dangerous threat to those freedoms. Therefore,
claims that the U.S. Constitution does not apply abroad, that habeas
corpus is a quaint irrelevance, or that persons can be held
incommunicado indefinitely are ones with which I have little
sympathy. But neither do I believe that there is a God-given right
not to be burdened with carrying an identity card, or disclosing to
the government information we have gladly given to private
corporations or that they have collected with our consent.
I do not believe that we should abandon the constitutional
restraints on the executive that distinguish what I have called
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states of consent. Indeed, I have undertaken my most recent
work-including this Comment-largely to forestall a situation in
which we might be forced to declare martial law because we refused
to debate openly and to act through our customary representative
processes to write laws that would anticipate a crisis. But neither
do I believe that all the post-Watergate reforms have the sanctity of
the structures of government that are constitutional in nature.
I therefore do not agree with Carl Schmitt that law does not (or
cannot) apply in emergency situations,' such as those brought into
being by terrorist attacks. Indeed, I strongly believe that the new
constitutional order coming into being compels us to provide legal
regimes for just such situations.
My principal recommendation is that we pay more attention to
our vulnerabilities. That, I take it, is the point of Professor
Levinson's Article, and indeed of this symposium. We must build up
our immune systems. Right now we are focused on a particular
virus-call it the Islamicist flu-and we are tempted to imagine that
future conflicts will be, like this one, a clash of cultures. This is
unlikely. We must continue our fight against this flu; where
possible, we need to get flu shots-like progress in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict-that will prevent the spread of infection. But
in the long run, we must prepare for sicknesses from many other
quarters, including those of which we have as yet no knowledge.
Much of our attention must be devoted to the future. The new
conditions of warfare, terrorism, and proliferation require that we
achieve a greater facility in dealing with possible futures. The
preemption of terrorism, the preclusion of humanitarian crises
brought on by genocide or ethnic cleansing, and the prevention of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for compellance all
require this. But the greatest of these trials of the imagination will
be the war against terror itself. For we can only know an epochal
war when it is past, and that past is, for the present, far in our
future.

48 See CARL SCHMmAr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FoUR CHAPTERS ON THE THEORY OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 n.1 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1934) ("There exists no norm
that is applicable to chaos.").
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All history is contemporary history. One might say the same sort
of thing about the study of the future, for we cannot escape the
impress of current preoccupations and dispositions whether we look
backwards or forwards. But the future is a land no one has visited.
Like the appointment with Major Major in the satirical novel Catch22," as soon as one steps into the office of the future, it is gone. Our
appointments are scheduled that way.
The past also has its iron imperative. We can visit, but never as
innocents, and no matter how ingenious or intrepid our efforts, we
cannot stay. We must put the war against terror in a strategic and
legal context, and though it has many things to say about the past
and about our common future, about law, and about war, it is
ultimately about our ever-shifting present.
IX.

CODA

I have often emphasized the theatrical nature of terror, and how
a global stage has been seized by terrorists in the twenty-first
century through the use of the Internet, satellite television, cable
channels, videocassettes, and the globalization of media. For some
terror groups, this is how the drama is cast: God is the prompter
whispering lines to the actors, who are the political leaders inciting
violence, while the world's peoples are the audience. But this
arrogates to the leaders the certain knowledge of God's politics that
no religious text can provide; it is, in its way, quite secular because
it removes God from the scene and keeps him in the wings. This
stage setting is the world of states of terror.
Imagine instead this arrangement: It is the political leader who
prompts the people, and it is they who are the actors on stage. This
is the world of states of consent. God himself is present, and He is
everywhere and at all times. As Kierkegaard put it:
In the most earnest sense, God is the critical
theatergoer, who looks on to see how the lines are
spoken and how they are listened to ....
The speaker

49 JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 31 (Simon & Schuster 1996) (1961) ("Major Major...

went jumping out the window of his office each time Yossarian [went] to speak to him .... ").
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is then the prompter, and the listener stands openly
before God. The listener, if I may say so, is the actor,
who in all truth acts before God.5 °
God observes courage in man's defiance of fear-as of the Iraqis
who bravely voted at polling stations even minutes after they had
been bombed-and He witnesses empathy for those who suffer and
ingenuity in our efforts to relieve that suffering. He observes not
only our cruelty and ruthlessness, but also our capacity for love and
loyalty.
If this is so, then I wish to ally myself with all that is hopeful in
mankind, gallant in mankind's adversity, and that which is
indomitable and gives life and that leads our sympathy away in
recoil from that which acclaims fear and exalts death.
We have time. The deaths and destruction from twenty-first
century terrorism have thus far been negligible compared to those
of twentieth century conventional wars. We must, however, prepare
our defenses. When we finally determine to take up the war against
terror in earnest, we will face a threat to mankind that is
unprecedented and is potentially measureless in its tragedy.
Having prepared, we will act so as to preclude such tragedies;
having acted in time, we will prevent the ultimate loss of our
liberties despite the historic suffering we could not in the end
preempt; having prevented such a loss while enduring such awful
pain, we will have prevailed. We must each play our part as though
the entire plot depended upon it, because it just might.
Every constitutional order of the state evokes a unique form of
terrorism. In Heaven, there will be no terror, and the lion will lie
down with the lamb. In Hell, there will be nothing but terror.

50 SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PURTY OF HEART IS TO WILL ONE THING 181 (Douglas V. Steere

trans., Harper Perennial 1956) (1938).

